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of the most important estate planning techniques

is the proper utilization of the marital deduction
provided by Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code.'
One of the most important devices utilized in qualifying a
devise or bequest for the marital deduction is the provision
for a life estate with a power of appointment in the surviving spouse, under subsection 2056(b) (5).2 However, the
application of this device is complicated by the necessity of
- The opinions expressed in this article are the personal views of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States
Department of Justice.
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., Columbia University; former
Attorney, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice.
** B.A., College of the City of New York; LL.B., Columbia University;
former Attorney, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice; former
Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District, New York.
' Unless otherwise indicated, all references will be to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. There is also a correlative gift tax provision, § 2523, with
identical problems. It is almost entirely in the estate tax area, however,
that the problems discussed in this article have come to the fore.
2The statutory scheme operates briefly as follows. Section 2056(a)
allows as a deduction from the gross estate an amount equal to the value
of property interests (included in the gross estate) passing from the
decedent to the surviving spouse, up to a maximum of 50 per cent of the
adjusted gross estate. Section 2056(b) (1) provides that the deduction is
not allowable, if the interest passing to the surviving spouse will lapse
or terminate after a period of time and pass to persons other than the
surviving spouse. This is called a "terminable interest," the most classic
form of which is a life estate. Various exceptions to this restriction exist,
however, the most important of which is contained in § 2056(b) (5).
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Among these is
meeting several technical requirements.'
the prerequisite that the surviving spouse be able to appoint
an entire interest, or a specific portion thereof, to herself
or her estate, alone and in all events.' In several other
respects the marital deduction requirements permit a certain
amount of flexibility. It does not matter, for example,
whether the interest passing to the surviving spouse is in
trust or not.' It is sufficient if the power is exercisable
either by will or during life,' although if such power is
exercisable during life it must be fully exercisable at any
time during life.8 Qualification for the marital deduction
is possible for either the entire interest in the property
passing from the decedent to his surviving spouse or a
specific portion thereof.9 But in order to qualify, a power
must meet all the requirements of section 2056(b) (5),
the most drastic of which is the "all events" test. If the
power fails to meet all the requirements, the interest passing
3 Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(a)(1)-(5).
(1) The surviving spouse must be entitled for life to all

of the

income from the entire interest or a specific portion of the entire interest,
or to a specific portion of all the income from the entire interest.
(2) The income payable to the surviving spouse must be payable annually or at more frequent intervals.
The surviving spouse must have the power to appoint the entire
(3)
interest or the specific portion to either herself or her estate.
(4) The power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by her
alone and (whether exercisable by will or during life) must be exercisable
in all events.
The entire interest or the specific portion must not be subject
(5)
to a power in any other person to appoint any part to any person other
than the surviving spouse.
4 For convenience, this article will generally assume that the surviving
spouse is a widow, although, of course, this need not be the case. The statute
itself makes no distinction on the basis of the sex of the surviving spouse.
5 Section 2056(b) (5).
6Treas. Regs. §20.2056(b)-5(a).
7 Section 2056(b) (5).
s Treas. Regs. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1) (ii).
9 Section 2056(b) (5). Several of the earlier decisions denied the marital
deduction because the surviving spouse's power only related to a part of,
Estate of John C. Zeman, 17 P-H
and not the entire, trust interest
Tax Ct. Mem. 336 (1958); Estate of Harrison P. Shedd, 23 T.C. 41
(1954), aff'd, 237 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. deided, 352 U.S. 1024
(1957); Estate of Louis B. Hoffenberg, 22 T.C. 1185 (1954), aft'd, 223
This requirement was ameliorated by the 1954
F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1955).
code, which permitted "specific portions" of trust interests to qualify. Section
93 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958 extended this relief retroactively to April 1, 1948. P.L. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606.
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to the surviving spouse will be deemed "terminable" under
section 2056(b) (1) and the marital deduction will be
lost.
This article will explore the "all events" test in the
light of nearly two decades of experience. The subject has
been the source of considerable litigation and is necessarily
complex not only because of the detailed requirements of
the statute and regulations, but also because of the myriadic
forms of testamentary disposition and the impact of divergent
state rules of law which are important in determining the
nature of the powers created.
Since we are dealing in an area of precise terminology,
it seems desirable to set forth the statutory provision in
question together with material portions of the legislative
history and regulations.
THE STATUTE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND REGULATIONS

Section 2056 (b) (5) provides:
Life Estate with Power of Appointment in Surviving Spouse.In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the
income from the entire interest, or all the income from a
specific portion thereof, payable annually or at more frequent
intervals, with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the
entire interest, or such specific portion (exercisable in favor
of such surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving
spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each case
the power is exercisable in favor of others), and with no
power in any other person to appoint any part of the interest,
or such specific portion, to any person other than the surviving
spouse (A) the interest or such portion thereof so passing shall,
for purposes of subsection (a), be considered as passing to
the surviving spouse, and
(B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for purposes
of paragraph (1)(A), be considered as passing to any person
other than the surviving spouse.
This paragraph shall apply only if such power in the surviving
spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion
thereof, whether exercisable by will or during life, is exercisable by such spouse alone and in all events.

ST. JOHNS LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.

40

The marital deduction was first enacted into law in
1948.10 Its primary purpose was to equalize the estate tax
consequences of persons living in common law and community property states." Therefore, outright gifts to the
wife were generally required.'
Treasury Regulations Section 20.2056 (b) -5 (g) (3) implement the "all events" test as follows:
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1948, § 361 (a).
11 H.R. Rt,. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26 (1948); 1948-1
CuM. BULL. 241, 260 (1948); S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 1) 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5, 26-29 (1948) ; 1948-1 Cum. BuLL. 285, 303 (1948).
12 In 1957, the House passed H.R. 8881 in an effort to modify § 2056
to make it clear that the surviving spouse need not have a testamentary
power. H.R. REP. No. 1027, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 1, 3 (1957), accompanying H.R. 8881 contained the following excerpt:
In addition, the last sentence of subsection (a) of the bill provides that a power exercisable in all events includes an unrestricted
power exercisable by the surviving spouse at any time during her
life to use all or part of the property subject to the power, where
the power includes the right to dispose of the property in any manner
(including the power to dispose of it by gift), but such right does not
have to include the power to dispose of the property by will. The
purpose of this concluding sentence is to describe the general conditions under which the right of the surviving spouse to use, consume, or invade the property during life is the equivalent of the
right to dispose of it by will and therefore the equivalent of a general
This provision is intended to insure that
power of appointment
the marital deduction will be allowed in cases where the property
subject to the power would be includible in the gross estate of the
spouse upon her death. Thus, where the spouse has a power to
consume, invade, or appropriate the property, and she is the sole
judge of what the invasion, consumption, or appropriation is needed
for, such a power is intended to come within this provision. For
example, if the surviving spouse has, in addition to a life interest,
the unrestricted right, in her sole discretion, to invade and use the
property generally for her comfort, happiness and well being, such a
power would meet the test prescribed by the last sentence of subsection (a) even though there is no separately stated power to dispose of the property. These broad powers in the surviving spouse
to use, consume, or invade give the spouse an interest equivalent to a
general power of appointment, which makes the property includible
in the spouse's gross estate upon death. From this it follows that
the marital deduction is allowable with respect to such a property
interest. This is the result under the 1954 Code and the bill makes
it clear that it is to be the result under the 1939 Code.
H.R. 8881 died in the Senate Finance Committee and never became law.
Instead, H.R. 8381, which ultimately became Section 93 of the Technical
Amendments Act of 1958, included no parallel legislative history. The liberal
verbiage of H.R. REP. No. 1027, correlated to the rules under §2041,
was mistakenly cited by the district court in Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v.
United States, 188 F. Supp. 839 (W.D.N.Y. 1960), corrected on appeal,
297 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Piatt v. Gray, 321 F.2d 79 (6th
Cir. 1963).
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Likewise, if there are any restrictions, either by the terms
of the instrument or under applicable local law, on the exercise of a power to consume property (whether or not held
in trust) for the benefit of the spouse, the power is not
In order for a power of inexercisable in all events. . ..
vasion to be exercisable in all events, the surviving spouse
must have the unrestricted power exercisable at any time
during her life to use all or any part of the property subject to the power, and to dispose of it in any manner, including the power to dispose of it by gift (whether or not
she has power to dispose of it by will).

The "all events" test is, however, made explicitly subject to
several minor exceptions which are discussed below.
SECTION 2056(b) (5) As APPLED
Reservations to the "All Events" Test

Although the requirement that the widow be able to
appoint an interest in favor of herself or her estate "in
all events" implies and has been interpreted to be a test
of most stringent application, the regulations have recognized that the test is not to be pushed to an utter extreme.

Thus, delays in the distribution of property occasioned by
the exercise of the power during the administration of

the decedent's estate will not disqualify the interest."
Limitations of a purely formal nature may also be ignored."
Estate of Wilhelmina L. Ben'13Treas. Regs. §20.2056(b)-5(g)(4).
It is imperative, however, that the widow
jamin, 44 T.C. 598 (1965).
actually have the requisite powers during the period of administration. This
was the issue in Robertson v. United States, 310 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1962),
reversing 199 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ala. 1961). The fifth circuit there held
that under the terms of a somewhat ambiguous will, the widow did actually
possess the power of disposition during the period of administration.
Examples of formal limitations
14 Treas. Regs. §20.2056(b)-5(g)(4).
which do not disqualify a bequest for the marital deduction are: (during
life), that the exercise be in a particular form; that it be filed with the
trustee during the spouse's life; that reasonable notice be given; that
reasonable intervals elapse between successive partial exercises; or (by
will), that the power be exercised by will executed after the decedent's
death; that exercise be made by specific reference to the power. In a
gift tax case, Kidd v. Patterson, 230 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ala. 1964), the
donor's wife was given the power to assign certain insurance policies subject
to the insurer's approval. The purpose of such approval was to assure the
bona fides of the arrangements. The court regarded the government's effort
to disallow the marital deduction as "arid literalism" and found the wife
the absolute owner.
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Moreover, the widow need not actually exercise her power
for qualification, and, if takers in default of exercise are
named by the decedent, this will not prejudice the marital
deduction either. 5 Further, the use of a spendthrift clause
has recently been found not to be inconsistent with an unlimited power of appointment. 6
The Internal Revenue Service has also ruled that normal
state law restrictions on the exercise of the widow's power
during a period of legal incapacity do not preclude an
interest from qualifying for the marital deduction." But
care must be taken in this regard as was illustrated by
the overzealous draftsmanship displayed in Starrett V.
Commissioner.8 There, the decedent had given his wife
a life estate with an unrestricted power to acquire the
corpus of the trust. As a precaution, he had provided that
in the case of his wife's legal incapacity or upon the appointment of a guardian, conservator or other custodian, her
power would cease and her guardian, conservator or other
custodian would be empowered to withdraw corpus for her.
The estate contended that this provision accomplished no
more than Rhode Island law would in any event, and
perhaps not as much. But the first circuit found a hole
in the argument. Under Rhode Island law the appointment
of a guardian would only suspend her power, whereas the
decedent had provided for it to cease under such conditions.
In fact, the widow never became legally incapacitated and
no guardian was ever appointed. But viewed from the point
of the decedent's death, it was not clear that her power
was exercisable "in all events." The Tax Court had held
that a guardian, conservator or other custodian might be
appointed upon the happening of events short of legal incapacity and this, too, would terminate her power. 9
Had the decedent's will been silent on the problem of
legal incapacity, both courts apparently assumed the trust
would have qualified. Thus, the appointment of a guardian
'15 Treas. Regs. § 20.2056(b) -5(g) (2).
16

Estate of Wilhelmina L. Benjamin, supra note 13.
BULL. 384.

17 Rev. Rul. 55-518, 1955-1 CuA.
18223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955).

19 Frank E. Tingley, 22 T.C. 402 (1954).
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for the widow is not an event deemed to "terminate"
the widow's interest. The first circuit emphasized that the
widow's powers were only suspended in such event, but
the more basic consideration is that all powers would be
subject to such contingency and a contrary rule would reduce
the marital deduction to a nullity.
Relation-ship Between Section. 201 and 2056
A consideration of the legislative history would seem
to evince a basic purpose of assuring that any interest
qualifying for the marital deduction would also qualify for
inclusion in the gross estate of the surviving spouse, unless
dissipated or given away during her lifetime. Yet it is plain
that the regulations are not satisfied with a mere harmonious
interplay between section 20-1 and section 2056. Nor
are the cases.2" Under section 2041, property subject to a
power of appointment is includible in the gross estate unless
limited by an ascertainable standard, i.e., measurable in
terms of the holder's needs for health, education and support.2 If measured by an unascertainable standard, such
as the "comfort, welfare and happiness" of the widow, the
property subject to the power would be included in the
widow's gross estate22 upon her subsequent death, even
though the decedent husband's estate would not be eligible
203 Pipe's Estate v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 815 (1957); Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (lst Cir.
1955).
21Treas. Regs. §20.2041-1(c)(2). In many decisions, the surviving
spouse's power was limited by an ascertainable standard and would thus not
have even been included in the survivor's estate under §2041. Peyton's
Estate v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963), affirming 21 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1111 (1962) (invasion authorized for the "comfortable maintenance of my said wife and children"); Estate of Elwood Comer, 31 T.C.
1193 (1959) (to withdraw principal "for her maintenance, comfort and general welfare"); Estate of E. W. Noble, 31 T.C. 888 (1959) (to use corpus
"for her maintenance, support and comfort") ; Estate of Thomas W. Tebb,
27 T.C. 671 (1957) (to dispose of corpus "for her own maintenance, care
and normal living expenses"); Estate of Michael Melamid, 22 T.C. 966
(1954) ("to use so much of it as she may need for the way of life to
which she and I have been accustomed").
See also Rev. Rul. 55-395,

1955-1 Cume. BuLL. 458.

22Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
876 (1964).
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for the marital deduction.23 This disparity, along with the
broader definition of a general power under section 2041
(to include powers exercisable in favor of creditors of the
decedent or his estate), might be explicable in terms of an
administrative safeguard to avoid the incidence of a double
benefit in a close case, i.e., allowance of the marital deduction to the husband's estate and exclusion from the
widow's gross estate upon her subsequent death.2 4 The
wisdom of this lack of correlation -will be discussed later.
26 the widow was
In Estate of May v. Commissioner,
given a legal life estate in the residuary estate with the
right, in her sole discretion, to invade principal for her
"comfort, happiness and well-being."
Upon the widow's
death the residue of this property, "if any there be, after
said life use thereof by my said wife," was to be divided
among the decedent's children and grandchildren. Under
New York law, the second circuit found that even these
broad powers of invasion did not confer upon her the ability
to appoint to herself." Accordingly, the marital deduction
23See Estate of May v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 903 (1961).
24 There might still be the possibility-albeit a rare one-of a double
benefit in a case like the following. If the decedent (dying in 1955),
created a trust in 1940, in which he retained a life interest, and the trust
instrument provided that upon his death his wife would have a life
interest with a general power of appointment (with the property passing to
the children on default), these consequences would follow: The trust
corpus would be included in the decedent's gross estate under §2036(a)(1)
and would be deemed to have passed to his wife under §2056(e)(4). The
decedent's estate would thus get the marital deduction but nothing would be
included in the widow's estate if she didn't exercise her power, it being
created prior to October 21, 1942. Treas. Regs. § 2041 (a) (1).
25 But see Security-Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp.
40 (W.D. Pa. 1965), where, in deciding that a power vested in a trustee
did not warrant any inclusion in the gross estate of the beneficiary under
§ 2041, the court felt that the marital deduction cases furnished a close
parallel.
26 Supra note 23.
27The court cited Matter of Britt, 272 App. Div. 426, 71 N.Y.S.2d 405
(3d Dep't 1947); Matter of Briggs, 101 Misc. 191, 167 N.Y. Supp. 632
(N.Y. Surr. Ct.), modified, 180 App. Div. 752, 168 N.Y. Supp. 597 (3d
Dep't 1917), modified and surrogate's decree aff'd, 223 N.Y. 677, 119
N.E. 1032 (1918). These cases enunciate the so-called "good faith" doctrine,
i.e., that even when a widow is given broad powers of invasion and consumption, she must exercise such powers in good faith, and cannot waste or
give away the property and thereby deprive the remaindermen of their
interest.
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was denied because the widow's power was not exercisable
in "all events."
The estate in this instance apparently relied upon the
legislative history to support its contention that, since the
property subject to the power would be wholly includible
in the widow's estate upon her subsequent death, 8 the
marital deduction should be granted to the husband's estate
to avoid double taxation. But the court found the statutory
language too clear to merit reference to the statutory history.
Moreover, Pipe's Estate had already set forth the requirement that the life tenant be able to appoint an interest
to herself enabling her to devise the subject property before
a marital deduction will be allowed.29 That "double taxation"
might result from the denial of the marital deduction to
the husband's estate and the inclusion of the property in
the widow's estate upon her subsequent death under section
2041 could not alter the clear mandate of the statute. That
similar bequests might be treated differently in other states
was not significant; the lack of uniformity was attributable
to the decedent's disposition which must always be read
in the light of the law of his state.
It also should be noted that importation into section
2056 of the "remoteness" test,30 such as is used in the
charitable deduction area, was specifically rejected in Estate
of Allen L. Weisberger.2 In other words, it is of no help
to marital deduction qualification to demonstrate that the
likelihood of occurrence of the terminating contingency is
negligible.
Nrecessity of a Testamentary Power
Since section 2056(b) (5) (and its 1939 code predecessor, section 812 (e) (1) (F)) clearly indicates that
See note 11, supra.
29 Pipe's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 20. The court regarded this
ruling in Pipe's Estate to be dictum, asserting that the holding was based
on the use of a mere legal life estate. A careful reading of judge
Waterman's opinion discloses no'square ruling on this point.
30 See Treas. Regs. § 20.2055-2(b), which provides that a charitable bequest
which is conditioned upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of a precedent
event will, nevertheless, give rise to a charitable deduction if the "possibility
that the charitable transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be
negligible." Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
3129 T.C. 217, 222 (1957).
2s
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powers may qualify "whether exercisable by will or during
life," it may seem surprising that any question could arise
as to whether the widow must be given a power to appoint
by will to qualify a bequest for the marital deduction. Yet
there has been a good deal of uncertainty on this point.
Consider one of the earliest appellate decisions in the area,
Pipe's Estate v. Commissionei-. 2 The widow was given a
legal life estate in the residue of the decedent's estate,
"with full power to use, enjoy, sell or dispose of the income
and principal thereof, or any part thereof, for such purposes
and in such manner as she in her uncontrolled discretion
may choose, it being my desire to place no restraint on her
in any respect concerning the absolute right of full disposition and use of the whole or any part of said income
or principal of my residuary estate, except that she shall
have no power over the disposition of such part thereof as
remains unexpended at the time of her death." Upon
the widow's death, the identifiable remnants of the decedent's
estate were to pass to certain named legatees.
The Pipe case arose under the 1939 code. At that time,
section 812 (e) (1) (F) required that the widow's interest be
in trust to qualify, an artificial requirement abolished by
the 1954 code, and, retroactively, by Section 93 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958 as to decedents dying after
April 1, 1948. Had the court rested its decision on the
ground that the widow's interest was not in trust," no
important precedent for present purposes would have resulted 34 and the case could casually be dismissed as one not
affected by Section 93 of the Technical Amendments Act
of 195821 But Judge Waterman, writing for himself and
32 Supra note 20.
33 Compare the Tax Court's opinion, 23 T.C. 99 (1954).

34 There is now substantial authority treating
trustee for fiduciary reporting purposes. United
278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960); Weil v. United
(Ct Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960);

Cum. BULL.

245.

But see Hirschmann

the life beneficiary as a
States v. de Bonchamps,
States, 180 F. Supp. 407
Rev. Rul. 61-102, 1961-1

v.' United

States, 309 F.2d 104

(2d Cir. 1962). Several New York cases seemed to support this principle.
Keefe v. Keefe, 257 N.Y. 604, 178 N.E. 814 (1931); Peck v. Smith, 227
N.Y. 228, 125 N.E. 91 (1919); Seaward v. Davis, 198 N.Y. 415, 92 N.E.
1107 (1910).
35 See Estate of Wallace S. Howell, 28 T.C. 1193 (1957).
See also
Estate of Harriet C. Evilsizor, 27 T.C. 710 (1957) (where the estate
did not even raise §812(e)(1)(F) because of the absence of a trust).
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Judge Medina, declined to base the decision on so narrow
a ground." Instead, the court ruled that Mrs. Pipe's power
to consume was not an "unlimited power to invade." She
could consume the corpus, but she could not appoint any
part of the corpus to herself since whatever was left over
at her death would pass to the decedent's named remaindermen. The fact that the unconsumed principal might be
included in Mrs. Pipe's estate upon her subsequent death
was not a sufficient basis for allowing a marital deduction
if the specific statutory requirements were not met. There
was no finding by the court that Mrs. Pipe could not give
the property away during her lifetime or that she was even
subject to good faith limitations under New York law.
Rather, the mere inability to appoint the property by her
will disqualified her interest."
The key language of Judge Waterman's opinion was as
follows:
But even assuming, arguendo, that the bequest at bar did
create a 'trust' under the law of New York that would comply
with the minimal requirements of subsection 812(e) (1) (F),
we must hold that it does not qualify for the marital deduction under that section. We cannot do otherwise, for a

reading of this statutory provision and its apposite Treasury
Regulations in their entirety makes it clear that Mrs. Pipe's
power to invade and consume is not the type of 'unlimited
power to invade' referred to in the Regulations. See U.S.
Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a. During her lifetime no restraint
whatsoever is imposed upon her power to consume or dispose

of the principal of her life estate as she wishes. She has a
power to consume, but she may not devise or bequeath any
unconsumed corpus at her death to beneficiaries of her own

choice.

Thus her power under the terms of Mr. Pipe's will

is not the 'unlimited power to invade' referred to in the
Regulations, because to comply with that requirement, the

'power in the surviving spouse must be a power to appoint

the corpus to herself as unqualified owner or to appoint the
corpus as a part of her estate, that is, in effect, to dispose
of it to whomsoever she pleases.' U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a.

Or, in the language of the statute itself, the surviving spouse
36 Judge Swan's dissent found the majority's approach too narrow and
inconsistent with the basic purpose of the statute.
37 See also McIntyre v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 401 (W.D. Ky.
1961); Estate of Julius Selling, 24 T.C. 191 (1955).
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must be able to appoint the entire corpus 'free of the trust'
to, herself or her estate. This Mrs. Pipe cannot do, because
as long as any of the corpus of her estate remains, it will be
held 'in trust' for the named remaindermen.3 8
Section 812(e) (1) (F) of the 1939 code required the
widow to be able to appoint the entire corpus "free of the

trust," a requirement not specifically imposed by the 1954
code in light of the elimination of the trust requirement.
However, Treasury Regulations Section 20.2056(b) -5(g)
(2) includes such a requirement, 9 and the thrust of
Pipe's Estate is therefore not confined to the cases arising
under the 1939 code.
It is an oversimplification, however, to say that Pipe's
Estate required a testamentary power of appointment.

What the second circuit thought was necessary was that the
widow have the power to remove the property from the
stricture of the trust or life estate so that she could then
become the unqualified owner, and thus have all rights of
an absolute owner, including the power of testamentary
disposition. Finding that the widow did not have the
power to confer upon herself the entire bundle of rights
that constitute absolute ownership, the court denied the
deduction.

Thus, had the Pipe will created a trust for

the widow and had the widow's powers during life included
the power to remove the corpus from the trust, the court
presumably would have upheld the marital deduction, even
though the will did not give her a testamentary power of
appointment."'
3 241 F.2d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 1957).
'3 Treas. Regs. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (2) provides:
The power of the surviving spouse must be a power to appoint
the entire interest or a specific portion of it as unqualified owner (and
free of the trust if a trust is involved, or free of the joint tenancy
if a joint tenancy is involved) or to appoint the entire interest or a
specific portion of it as a part of her estate (and free of the trust
if a trust is involved), that is, in effect, to dispose of it to whomsoever
she pleases.
40 See Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960); Stallworth
v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958); Newton v. Wiseman, 2 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 6352 (W.D. Okla. 1958), where a trust was created for the
widow with respect to certain stock but the widow could sell the stock and dispose of the proceeds by will; Estate of Leo A. Bourke, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
496 (1960), where the widow could withdraw the entire corpus upon request.
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Even so, the theory of Pipe's Estate is subject to
serious question, although the second circuit has subsequently reaffirmed its position.4 1 Initially, it should be
recalled that the regulations apparently do not interpret the
"free of the trust" requirement quite so strictly. Treasury
Regulations Section 20.2056(b)-5(g) (3) seems to provide
that an unrestricted power of disposition during life, including the power to make gifts, will suffice.2 In-other words, if
the widow can give the property away, she is effectively disposing of it "free of the trust." While it is true she cannot
dispose of it "free of the trust" in every way imaginable, she
is empowered to do everything with the property during life
that a fee simple owner could. Given the policy of the
statute to equalize common law and community property
states, the fact that the widow's estate, upon her subsequent
death, would be obliged to include, as part of her gross
estate, the undisposed remainder of such property might well
be sufficient to justify the deduction. Whether she is to be
deemed the "unqualified owner" of such property if she lacks
the power of testamentary disposition depends on the manner in which one views that term in the context of a statute
which provides for qualification of powers "exercisable by
will or during life."
In any event, there is a considerable body of authority
which either expressly or implicitly rejects the Pipe doctrine.
Perhaps the leading case to the contrary is McGehee v.
Commissioner,4 ' where the surviving husband received realty
"in fee simple . . . with full power to dispose of the same
and to use the income and corpus thereof in such manner
as he may determine, without restriction or restraint." At
his death any property not disposed of was to pass to named
But see United States v. First Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank, 335 F.2d 107
(9th Cir. 1964). In this case the widow was given a life estate in two
residences with power to sell them and use the proceeds to buy another
residence to which she would acquire a fee simple title. Because she could
acquire another residence, the ninth circuit felt her powers were not unqualified in all events from the time of death.
41 See Estate of May v. Commissioner, supra note 23.
See also United
States v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 297 F2d 891 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 887 (1962).
42But
see Estate of Francis F. Field, 40 T.C. 802 (1963).
43260 F2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958).
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remaindermen. At first the marital deduction was denied
because the bequest was not in trust. But shortly after the
initial decision, the Technical Amendments Act of 1958 was
passed, retroactively amending section 812(e) (1) (F) of
the 1939 act to eliminate the trust requirement. The McGehee
case was then submitted for rehearing, and this time the
deduction was allowed. The Government had contended
that even under the revised law the widower's power was not
unrestricted. But the court perceived no good faith limitation nor any barrier to the widower's power to make
gifts. On rehearing, no reference whatever was made to
the Pipe case. Yet it would seem that the McGehee property
was subject to the same defect deemed fatal in Pipe, the
inability of the surviving spouse to give himself an unqualified interest during life which would later be subject
to his testamentary disposition. The court did observe,
however, that the gift over of the property undisposed of
prevented the gift from being in fee, but it did not restrict
or qualify the power of disposition.4"
In Newton qv. Wiseman,45 the idow was given the
right to dispose of certain stock, with a gift over if she
failed to exercise her power. The court first observed that
the Pipe case was distinguishable, in that there was no
restriction on the disposition the widow could make of the
proceeds of any sale either during life or by will. But, in
any event, the court thought that Judge Swan's dissent in
Pipe represented the better rule.
In Nettz v. Phillips," the widow received property
under a joint and mutual will "absolutely and in fee simple."
Upon her death she was found contractually obligated to
pass such property to persons named in the joint will. But
during her lifetime there was, under the terms of the
will and under Iowa law, no limitation whatever upon her
44
McGehee was followed in Bone v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 97
(W.D. Ark. 1965); Carlson v. Patterson, 190 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ala.
1961); Boyd v. Gray, 175 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Ky. 1959), on remand from
261 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1958). These cases were based on similar facts
and were also decided without reference to Pipe.
45 2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6352 (W.D. Okla. 1958).
46 202 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Iowa 1962).
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right to dispose of the property as she saw fit.4' The court
was thus duly confronted with the Pipe and McGehee lines
of cases. It chose the latter, pointing to the fact that both
statute and regulations seemed to contemplate powers exercisable by will or during life."
What appeared to be the final chapter on this question
arose in Piatt v. Gray,0 where the widow was given the right
to expend principal whenever, in her opinion, it was necessary for her "maintenance, comfort or well-being," without
being required to account. The decedent's sister and her
children were to take the "remainder" of his estate. The
district court, " relying on Pipe, had held that the lack of
a testamentary power of disposition was fatal to qualification. On appeal, the Government conceded that this
requirement was not necessary, and the sixth circuit held
for the Government on other grounds.
However, there was added a disappointing epilogue to
the story in Estate of FrancisF. Field." There, the widow
was given the power to consume the decedent's "entire estate
for any purpose which she shall deem advisable." In the
event the widow did not exercise her power, the children
were to receive the corpus. In a proceeding to construe
the will, it was determined that the widow had "the unrestricted power exercisable at any time during her life
without accounting to any person whomsoever-to use all
or any part of the trust property, and to dispose of or
consume it in any manner, including the power to dispose
of it by gift."
4 Compare Allen v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
Here the widow was given the decedent's entire estate provided she filed
an agreement with the appropriate surrogate requiring her to leave the
bulk of her estate to the decedent's four children, one of whom was a
daughter of a prior marriage. Otherwise, she was to be given her statutory
share. The widow elected to file the required agreement. The effect of
this disposition was found to give the widow a life estate with a broad
but not unlimited power of consumption. She was subject to good faith
limits, could not appoint to herself or waste the assets. Accordingly, the
marital deduction was denied.
-1 Cf. Estate of James Mead Vermilya, 41 T.C. 226 (1963).
41321 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1963).
1; 9 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1866 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
5140 T.C. 802

(1963).
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Although there were various circumstances present suggesting the probate decree was collusive, the Tax Court found
it unnecessary to pass on such question. To qualify, the
widow had to be able to appoint the property involved to
herself or her estate. The Tax Court perceived no such
power in the decedent's will. The widow could not shortcircuit the interest of the children by appointing unconsumed
corpus free of the trust to her own-estate. Even the power
to give the property away was not deemed enough and the
marital deduction was denied.
While the "all events" test may have been satisfied
under Treasury Regulations Section 20.2056(b) -5(g) (3),
the quantum of the widow's power was simply held insufficient. The Tax Court thus traveled the full circle back
to Pipe's Estate.
Necessity of the Power to Make Gifts
It now seems to be established that a mere power of
consumption is never enough for marital deduction qualification, a point well illustrated in Estate of Thomas J.
Semmes.5" In this instance, the widow was sole trustee and
was authorized "to encroach upon the principal or corpus
of said trust property for her own benefit, at any time she
sees fit, without accounting" to the decedent's children who
were designated remaindermen following the widow's death.
Upon the death of the children and their issue during the
widow's life, the trust was to terminate and the trust
property was to belong "absolutely and totally" to the widow
to do with as she pleased.
The Tax Court conceded that the widow's right to
encroach for her own benefit was unrestricted. But she
could not give the property away nor could she appoint the
unused corpus to herself as unqualified owner. Elaborate
provisions for the disposition of the trust corpus upon the
widow's death and the contrasting absoluteness of the wife's
control upon the prior death of the children and their
issue were found indicative of an insufficiently pervasive
5232

T.C. 1218 (1959), aff'd per curiant, 288 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1961).
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power. The
analysis and
Neither
in Treasury

sixth circuit agreed with the Tax Court's
affirmed its decision.
court commented on the following sentence
Regulations Section 20.2056(b) (5)-(g) (3) :

Likewise, if there are any restrictions either by the terms
of the instrument or under applicable local law, on the
exercise of the power to consume property (whether or not
held in trust) for the benefit of the spouse, the power is not
exercisable in all events.
This sentence suggests that an unrestricted power to consume, as in Semmes, might be sufficient. The regulations do
go on to require that there also be the power to give the
property away; but if such a power of gift is necessary, then
a power of consumption would normally not be significant
since a testator rarely invests his spouse with unlimited
power of gift but only a limited power of consumption.
Hence, Semmes presented a good vehicle for determining
whether this requirement of the regulations (not the statute)
that the widow must have the power to give the property
away is in accord with the legislative history and the related
(more accurately, unrelated) provisions dealing with the inclusion in the widow's estate upon her subsequent death of
powers of consumption under section 204-1.11 But neither
court perceived any significant problem in this regard and
the marital deduction was denied.
In Estate of Wiliam A. Landers, Sr...4 the widow was
given certain property "to have and use as long as she
lives and remains single." There followed a gift over at her
death of "whatever of this property remains." These provisions were interpreted somewhat ambiguously in a construction proceeding, but the Tax Court understood the
construction to give the widow a life estate with a power
to use the property and invade corpus "apparently at her
own whim." Under Georgia law she could use the property
freely with no liability for waste, but she could not give
the property away. This defect caused the widow's interest
to fall short of the "all events" test and the marital de53

See Treas. Regs. 20.2041-1(b)(1).

5438

T.C. 828 (1962).
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duction was denied. In Piatt v. Gray,55 the sixth circuit,
carefully reviewing Kentucky law, found that the widow's
right to expend principal for her "maintenance, comfort or
well being" was not the requisite unqualified power necessary for allowance of the marital deduction. She could
not give the principal away nor use it as she saw fit, nor
commit willful waste. It accordingly felt compelled to chalk
up one more victim for the "all events" test.
The Effects of Local Law
If the surviving spouse must have the power to make
gifts to qualify the power under section 2056(b) (5), consideration of other lesser restrictions imposed by local law
would seem superfluous. Yet a number of decisions have
been reached on such other grounds. The most important
of these is the so-called "good faith limitation," i.e., the
requirement that she exercise her powers in a manner so
as not to frustrate unfairly the decedent's testamentary
scheme."
In a sense, the application of the "good faith"
test may be but another way of analyzing whether there
exists the power to make gifts, but it also involves a somewhat broader restriction on the widow's powers.
Thus, in Commissioner v. Ellis Estate," the surviving
widow was given the right to all the net income of a trust,
except that principal was to be invaded to assure her of at
least $5,000 per year. In addition, she was authorized to
invade the trust corpus should she "require" sums in excess
of $5,000, she, and she alone, to be the judge of how much
was to be required. The Tax Court, pointing to the fact
that the trust corpus would be includible in the widow's
estate upon her subsequent death, under section 2041,
had allowed the deduction."' But the third circuit construed Pennsylvania law to impose a "good faith" limit on
the exercise of her power.5
She could not give the property
55 Supra note 49.
56 See note 23 supra.

252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
58 26 T.C. 694 (1956).
59 The court cited: Rumsey's Estate, 237 Pa. 448, 451, 135 Ati. 119,
120 (1926); Zumbro v. Zumbro, 69 Pa. Super. 600, 603 (1918).
57
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away or prefer certain heirs or beneficiaries." Accordingly,
she could not exercise her powers "in all events."
The Tax Court in Ellis Estate had read Starrett as
suggesting that possible limitations arising by operation of
local law should not disqualify the power. With respect
to the widow's obligation to exercise her power "honestly"
this was a reminder that she was to consume and not donate
the corpus. It observed:
This rule applies to every such power to invade or consume
the principal, however broad. If its operation is to prevent a
power subject thereto from being 'unlimited' we must, in
effect, hold that in Pennsylvania it is impossible to form a
trust subject to a power to consume corpus which may
qualify for the marital deduction under section 812(c)(1)(F).
This we are not prepared to do.'
No emphasis was given by either court to the fact that the
invasion of principal was to occur only as the widow "required," a distinction later deemed crucial.2 But for the
third circuit in Ellis a strict interpretation of the statutory
requirements was necessary to fulfill the congressional
intent. 3
Two years later, the third circuit was again confronted
with a similar question in Hoff man v. McGines." This time
the widow was empowered:
to use and spend any or all of the principal of my said estate,
if she so desires, and upon her requests made to said.
Trustees, they shall pay to her from time to time any part of
the principal of my estate she may desire and said trust shall
cease as to that part of the principal so paid to her.
It is my intention that my said wife . ..

shall have the

whole income and interest from my estate and use and spend
any part or all of the principal that she may desire during
her lifetime.

60 Degenkolv v. Daube, 143 Pa. Super. 579, 586, 18 A.2d 464, 467 (1941);
In re Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa. 218, 226, 43 At. 131, 133 (1899).
c3Supra note 58, at 700.
62 Hoffman v. McGinnes, supra note 40.
63 It is questionable, however, whether property subject to such a power
would even be included in Mrs. Ellis' estate. Compare National Bank v.
United States, 181 F. Supp. 851 (D.C. Mass. 1960), with Strite v. McGinnes,
330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 876 (1964).
64277 F.2d 598 (1960).
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The court found the widow's power of withdrawal unrestricted and allowed the marital deduction. Ellis' Estate
was distinguished because there withdrawals were to be
made as. "required" while in Hoff man they were to be made
as "desired." Moreover, the decedent's intention not to
inhibit his wife was shown by his explicit direction that
the trust was to cease once withdrawn by the widow. Also
noted was the reiteration of the decedent's intention showing
a dominant concern for the widow.
The court felt that a more explicit direction to give
the widow an unrestricted power would have been difficult
to create. Not even good faith limited her power. 5 Presumably, although the court did not explicitly so find, she
could have given the corpus away. Since the widow could
effect a withdrawal "free of the trust," any such property
remaining at her death would have been subject to her
testamentary disposition and the defect noted in Pipe was
thus not present.
In United States v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.,"6
the full thrust of state "good faith" limitations was sharply
illustrated. The widow was given the "right to use any
part of the principal" of the residue of the estate. After
her death, provision for named remaindermen was made.
The local surrogate's court indicated this meant that the
widow had an unlimited power to consume the principal.
But the second circuit understood this construction to be
subject to the usual limitations of "good faith," a conclusion
buttressed by the fact that there was nothing in the will
to indicate an intent to dispense with such limitations.
Further, she could not dispose of any part of principal by gift
or by will.
In its concluding paragraph, the court observed:
The ruling is quite technical, but unfortunately that is too
often so in tax matters. There may be arguments of policy
for change in the statutory requirements to broaden the marital
deduction, but this is a matter for the Congress, which, with
the problem plainly before it, failed in the Technical Amend65

Only one Pennsylvania lower court decision was found relevant.

Estate

of George M. Morriss, 26 Dauphin County Rep. 136 (Orphans' Ct. 1922).
6297 F.2d 891 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 887 (1962).
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ments Act of 1958 to remove or modify the requirement that

the power be exercisable in all events as a condition
of the
6
grant of the marital deduction in this situationY.
Recently, in Cavanaugh v. United States,' the widow
was given the right "to use so much of the principal as
she may desire for her own personal needs." She was to
have the sole option to determine her needs and the use to
which the estate was to be placed. At her death there was
a remainder over. The court found that Indiana law imposed a "good faith" requirement on the exercise of her power,
that she could not appoint to herself in all events, and
that the bequest was therefore not eligible for the marital
deduction."9
Sometimes local law goes quite far in limiting the pow70
ers of the surviving spouse. In Collings v. United States,
the widow was, in one paragraph, bequeathed the residue
of the decedent's estate. In the next paragraph, "any part
of my estate remaining undisposed of at the time of the
death of my said wife" was bequeathed to others. Construction proceedings reached the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which held that her power could be exercised only
for her support and comfort. Under such circumstances,
the marital deduction was, of course, denied.
Two cases have held that under Maryland law, an apparently unrestricted testamentary power cannot be exercised by the widow in favor of her estate in the absence
of a specific direction to that effect.7 Many estates have,
67 Id. at 893-94.
68 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 146, 824 (S.D. Ind. 1965).

-0 See also Matteson v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 535 (N.D.N.Y.
1956) ; Allen v. United States, supra note 47.
70 201 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Ky. 1961).
71 Pierpont's Estate v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964);
Estate of William C. Allen, 29 T.C. 465 (1957). By way of contrast, consider Geyer v. Bookwalter, 193 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Mo. 1961). The decedent
gave his "home place" to his wife. She was to have "[the] good and full
right to sell and convey fee simple title thereto, with such easements as are
appurtenant, and not account for the proceeds thereof." If unsold, the
property was to pass to his children surviving his wife. The Government
contended the widow had a mere power of sale. But the court felt that
she could also "convey" the property without consideration; that the
word "and" meant "or"; that the word "proceeds" did not imply consideration. The use of the phrases "home place" and "fee simple" and the lack
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of course, invoked the aid of local courts to buttress their
interpretation of the decedent's will in pursuit of the marital
deduction. This has often brought into focus the question
of whether such local court constructions were the products
of a genuinely contested litigation or "collusive decrees"
which the federal courts should properly ignore."' This
problem is by no means limited to the marital deduction
area, however, and its complexities are beyond the scope
of the present discussion."
Possibility of Enjoyment or Exercise of Power by Others
Even though the widow be designated the sole trustee,
the possibility that some one else will derive benefit from
the property will operate to preclude the marital deduction.7" As the statute provides, the widow must be
able to exercise her powers alone and in all events.
5 the income
In Estate of Theodore Geddings Tarver,'
was to be used by the widow "for her support and maintenance, and for the education, support and maintenance of
our children, in her discretion." Invasions of principal were
to be made "as and when she may demand, for her use
and/or the use or benefit of our children as she deems
Upon the widow's death, the trust was to be
advisable."
of accountability led the court to believe that the widow had the unrestricted power to give the property away. Of course, a mere power of
sale is not a power to appoint if the proceeds remain subject to the
limitations of the trust. Markoff v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 805 (D.C.R.I.
1960).
72 A partial list of such instances includes the Lincoln Rochester, Landers,
Stallworth and Field decisions; Estate of Peyton v. Commissioner, 323 F2d
438 (8th Cir. 1963); Shedd's Estate v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 345 (9th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1024 (1957); In re Sweet's Estate, 234
F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1957); Willcox v.
United States, 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 146, 822 (E.D. Va. 1965) ; Northwest
Security Nat'l Bank v. Walsh, 203 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.S.D. 1962), appeal
dismissed, 308 F.2d 367 (8th Cir. 1963); Dake's Estate v. United States,
8 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6059 (W.D.N.Y. 1961); Gordon v. United States,
163 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Mo. 1958); National Bank of Commerce v.
United States, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 2155 (E.D. Va. 1958).
73 See 1 MERTaNS, LAw OF FEDERAL. GiFT & ESTATE T AxTIOnN § 10.1910.23 (1959 ed.).
7 Treas. Regs. 20.2056(b)-5(a).
T.C. 490 (1956), aff'd on this issue, 255 F.2d 913 (4th Cir.
7526
1958).
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divided into shares for each of the decedent's children.
The Tax Court refused to infer that the widow had an
untrammeled discretion to demand all the corpus for her
own benefit under South Carolina law. A reading of the
will as a whole demonstrated the decedent's solicitude for
his children. Amounts appropriated for the use of any
child were to be reported to the trustee and deducted from
his share on ultimate distribution. Emergency provisions
for the benefit of the decedent's children after the widow's
death were cited. The decedent contemplated that the
corpus of certain trusts he intended to set up during his
life for his children might under certain circumstances become part of the testamentary trust.
The fourth circuit adopted the views of the Tax Court,
quoting extensively from its opinion. Thus, the presence
of other beneficiaries for whom the decedent manifested
substantial concern was enough to disqualify the power,
although for section 2041 purposes, the power may have been
broad enough to warrant inclusion in the widow's gross
estate upon her subsequent death.
In several other cases, the widow's powers have been
subject to the control of other persons and thus were
not exercisable alone and in all events. In Estate of Morton
H. Spero, 6 the widow and a bank were joint trustees. As
such they could invade for the "comfortable maintenance"
of either the idow or her children. At her death she
could appoint the then remaining principal to anyone, including her estate. There was, however, no certainty any
portion of the trust would then be remaining because of
the trustees' power of invasion. In Estate of Allen L. Weisberger" the deduction was lost when the trustee was empowered to divert income from the widow to her sons for
their "maintenance and education." 7
In Dexter v. United States, 9 the trustees were directed
to pay net income to the widow but authorized and
7634

T.C. 1116 (1960).

29 T.C. 217 (1957).
78 See also Flesher v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. W.Va.
1965); Thomas v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ohio 1962),
aff'd per curiam, 317 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1963); Estate of Raymond Parks
.7

Wheeler, 26 T.C. 466 (1956).
79 163 F. Supp. 442 (D.C. Mass. 1958).
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empowered to invade principal as she might request in
writing. The trustees were exhorted to protect the widow
against privation. The court found these provisions did not
give the widow absolute control. To the contrary, they indicated that the trustees were to have discretion in refusing
to accede to the widow's requests and this discretion, of
course, was incompatible with the requirements for
qualification.
In Gelb v. (ommissioner, 0 the widow was given:
(1) all the net income of the residuary trust; (2) the
amount of principal necessary to assure her at least $10,000
per year if net income was less than that figure; (3) the
right to withdraw up to $3,000 of principal for each daughter
that might marry if the widow wished to make her a
wedding gift. The trustees, of whom the widow was one
of three, were also empowered (4) to withdraw up to
$5,000 per year of principal for the "proper support,
maintenance, education and up-bringing" of his daughter
whom he "particularly" wished to provide for. At death,
the widow could appoint the trust corpus by will, and
at issue was the extent to which such power was limited
by these intervening provisions.
The possibility that the widow in her individual capacity might wish to make wedding gifts gave the court no
concern. This was for the widow to demand or not to
demand. But provision (4) for the daughter's benefit
could not satisfy the marital deduction requirements of exclusive control by the widow. Even though the widow was
trustee, there was no certainty she would remain so throughout her life."' In addition, equity would not permit her
so 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
81 The court distinguished in this respect Miller v. Dowling, 52 Am. Fed.
11,646 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), where the
Tax R. 1969, 1956-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
trustees could terminate a trust (otherwise qualifying) for the widow and
pay the corpus over to the children. The widow was one of the trustees,
but the Government argued she need not necessarily remain so and thus
others might some day be able to terminate her interest. But the district
court found that if the widow became incapacitated, a successor trustee
would be obliged to protect her interest under New York law and the
power to terminate could not be exercised in derogation of her rights. But
no similar reasoning protected Mrs. Gelb from invasion for her daughter
in the event she was not serving as trustee.
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to arbitrarily veto payments for her daughter for the purposes stated by the testator. But the entire deduction was
not lost. The daughter's yearly $5,000 interest (for the
joint lives of mother and daughter) could be actuarially
valued and when this was done, the remaining portion
subject only to the widow's control could properly constitute
a "specific portion" of the trust; notwithstanding the
Treasury Regulations to the contrary.2
The decedent in Gelb could have avoided all difficulty
merely by permitting the widow unqualifiedly to invade
corpus to the extent of .55,000 per year. He would, of course,
have had to rely on the widow's judgment in appropriately
maintaining their daughter but this is usually a safe risk.
Alternatively, a separate fund could have been set aside
for the daughter which probably could accomplish its purpose at a figure considerably less than the actuarial value
determined in Gelb. Moreover, other courts might not agree
that actuarial tables provide the requisite certainty demanded
by the "all events" test.
CONCLUSION

This survey of the area of marital deduction powers
discloses a not altogether satisfactory state of the law from
several standpoints. In the first place, a substantial number
of marital bequests have failed to qualify on technical
grounds that seem excessively stringent. As noted, Congress
was primarily concerned that the portion of an estate qualifying for the deduction should be included in the estate
of the surviving spouse, if not dissipated by her during
her lifetime. The statute as written, however, went further,
apparently to be sure that a deductible interest was not
excludible from the widow's estate. The regulations went
further yet in the Internal Revenue Service's zeal to protect
the Treasury, and some courts have been more stringent than
even the regulations. The result has been that many decisions disqualified interests that would clearly be included
in the widow's estate.
82 Treas. Regs. 20.2056(b)-5(c).
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Since the marital deduction is of great importance in
determining the applicable estate tax, the resultant harshness of unnecessarily technical requirements has led to an
uneven application of the law, divergences on numerous
critical points, and considerable variance in the characterization process which depends in substantial part on variant
state laws. These results are to some extent unavoidable
in view of the necessarily complex rules which must govern,
be they liberal or strict. But they, nevertheless, have in fact
tended to undermine the "national system" of estate taxation which Congress was plainly hopeful of achieving.
Moreover, it is apparent that a considerable amount
of litigation has arisen in the area; it is certainly one
of the oft-recurring problems in the estate tax field. Such
litigation causes not only costly delay and expense, but it
has projected the federal courts into the role of determining
important questions of state law and in an atmosphere where
non-tax considerations may not be given adequate weight.
This is without reference to "collusive decrees" which have
led to vexing questions of federal-state relations, but which
will probably occur no matter where the line is drawn.
From a planning point of view, the careful draftsman
may have no choice but to considerably restrict his estate
plan if he wishes to be sure of the marital deduction. This
could result in giving the widow a greater degree of control
than might perhaps be wise.
It would therefore appear desirable to ameliorate the
effects of the "all events" test, and two alternative (or possibly supplemental) methods suggest themselves. First, the
powers qualifying for marital deduction purposes under
section 2056 could be correlated to those qualifying for inclusion under section 2041. What qualifies for the deduction
would therefore, by definition, be includible in the widow's
estate. Secondly, section 2041 inclusions could be defined
to include all interests subject to powers which have been
judicially or administratively determined to merit the
This may occasionally require the
marital deduction."
83 This would avoid the possibility that different courts at different times
might adopt conflicting views of the instrument creating the power resulting
in either dual inconsistent benefits (i.e., full deduction to husband's estate,
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widow to seek to disallow the deduction, if it is to her advantage to do so, but it is doubtful that this will be a
significant problem since she will usually be able to minimize
her own estate's tax if she wishes to.
Almost twenty years of experience have taught that the
"all events" test is unnecessarily harsh. It now seems
appropriate to adopt a fairer and less contentious standard.

no inclusion in widow's estate), or no benefit to either estate (i.e., no
deduction to husband's estate, inclusion in widow's estate).

